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Six months ago, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in eBay v.
MercExchange, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (U.S. 2006), reversing the Federal Circuit’s
general rule that injunctions should issue in patent infringement cases absent
exceptional circumstances. The Court stated that injunctions should only issue
after a plaintiff has shown each factor of the traditional four-factor test.
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.
Id. at 1839. The Court, however, did not provide much guidance for how
district courts should apply this test. Although the Court’s recitation of the test
appears to provide a clear statement for a framework that district courts can
apply when determining whether to issue injunctions, for several reasons, the
result has mainly been confusion among district courts.
First, the Court failed to definitively answer whether the first factor, irreparable
harm, should be presumed after a showing of infringement. District courts
have split on this question. The first case to apply the eBay four-factor test, z4
Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006),
held that eBay did away with the presumption of irreparable harm. Several
other district courts followed this lead, but in Christiana Industries v. Empire
Electronics, 443 F. Supp. 2d. 870 (E.D. Mich. 2006), the district court rejected
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this interpretation of eBay when it issued a preliminary injunction. Likewise, in
Abbott Laboratories v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2006), the Federal Circuit appeared to imply that the presumption survived
eBay. The court denied Abbott’s motion for a preliminary injunction because
Abbott had “not established a likelihood of success on the merits.” The court
continued, “As a result Abbott is no longer entitled to a presumption of
irreparable harm.” Although the court ruled that Abbott was not entitled to the
presumption, it seemed to suggest that had Abbott shown a likelihood of
success, it would have been entitled to the presumption despite eBay. See
Posting of Dennis Crouch, http://patentlaw.typepad.com/ (Aug. 20, 2006). All
told, the Supreme Court failed to squarely address the validity of the
presumption in eBay, and as a result, courts have read eBay inconsistently.
Second, the Court has created confusion on how to apply the first two factors.
In fact, it seems that the Court failed even to state correctly the first two
factors. In Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d
1259 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006), Judge Pogue, writing for the Court of International
Trade, astutely noted, “Although stated as two separate prongs by the Court in
eBay, whether something is ‘irreparable’ requires, to a certain extent, a lack of
alternative remedies. . . . Under traditional principles of equity, ‘irreparable
injury is not an independent requirement for obtaining a permanent injunction;
it is only one basis for showing the inadequacy of a legal remedy.” Id. at 1264
n.4 (citations omitted). Judge Pogue has ample support for his observation.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines irreparable injury as, “[a]n injury that cannot be
adequately measured or compensated by money and is therefore often
considered remediable by injunction.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (8th
ed. 2004); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 4 (1991) (“[E]quitable remedies are
unavailable if legal remedies will adequately repair the harm.”).
Oddly, when laying out the four-factor test, the eBay Court even cited a case
that suggests a different set of factors. See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of
Gambell, 481 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987) (“The standard for a preliminary
injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the
exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits
rather than actual success.”). Thus, it seems that the first two factors should
be (1) actual success on the merits and (2) inadequacy of a legal remedy. This
quirk in the Court’s opinion has not been without effect. In KEG Technologies,
Inc. v. Laimer, 436 F. Supp. 2d. 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2006), the district court
declared that even though the first factor (irreparable harm) had been shown,
the plaintiff had not shown the second factor (inadequacy of damages). The
court allowed the plaintiff time to prepare for an evidentiary hearing because
the eBay opinion was handed down on the same day the judge in KEG was
asked to issue an injunction. But the question remains, what kind of
irreparable harm can be remedied by damages? (Answer: the reparable kind.)
Third, the Court failed to provide guidance on how courts should consider the
public interest in protecting patents. For instance, the Eastern District of
Texas’s application of the public interest factor in two cases has shown how
the test lacks rigidity. Judge Folsom in Tivo, Inc. v. Echostar Communications
Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex.), granted the plaintiff an injunction,
TTA Blog
Patently O
Wilson Sonsini's Silicon
Media Law Blog
Stanford Center for
Internet and Society
Blogs
Tech Law Advisor
Netlawblog
Patry Copyright Blog
Eric Goldman's Technology
& Law Blog
Berkman Center for
Internet and Society
Blog
Phosita
Promote the Progress
Berkeley Intellectual
Property Weblog
Lawrence Lessig's Blog
The Trademark Blog
Slashdot
Duke Law and Technology Review - iBlawg » Blog Archive » eBay at Six Months: Four-Factor Confusion
http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20070607181849/http://www2.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/iblawg/?p=43[9/27/2016 11:34:57 AM]
stating that “[t]he public has an interest in maintaining a strong patent system.”
Only the day before, however, Judge Folsom stated in Paice LLC v. Toyota
Motor Corp., No. 2:04 Civ. 211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16,
2006), that even though “there is a long recognized public interest in enforcing
patent rights . . . [r]elief in non-injunctive form also serves this public interest.”
Judge Folsom’s opinion shows how, without clear direction, the four-factor test
can break down in to a result-oriented test, in which the judge decides whether
to issue an injunction, then fills in the four-factor test with convenient quotes
from conflicting case law. Similar confusion has resulted on the question of
how to deal with future infringement. For instance, in Telequip Corp. v. The
Change Exchange, No. 5:01 Civ. 1748, 2006 WL 2385425 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 15,
2006), the district court held that “monetary damages are not an adequate
remedy against future infringement because the principal value of a patent is
its statutory right to exclude.” (citations omitted). In Voda v. Cordis, Corp., No.
03-1512, 2006 WL 2570614 (W.D. Okla.), however, the court issued a
compulsory license to remedy future infringement.
All told, the courts are scattered in their applications of eBay’s four-factor test.
In an upcoming post, I will propose a more concrete version of the four-factor
test for courts to apply.
Jim Sherwood is a J.D. Candidate at Duke University School of Law and is the
Editor-in-Chief of the Duke Law & Technology Review.
Posted in Patents & Technology :: 11/18/06 ::
One Response to “eBay at Six Months: Four-Factor Confusion”
You can follow the responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0  feed. You can leave a
response, or trackback from your own site.
professays :: 2/07/07 at 9:35 am
I suppose patents still protect the intellectual property.
Add a Comment
 Name (required)
 Mail (will not be published) (required)
 Website
XHTML: You can use these tags: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b>
<blockquote cite=""> <code> <em> <i> <strike> <strong>
